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Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Act
Charles Seligson*
The Bankruptcy Act allows the trustee in bankruptcy to avoid the
effect of certain transactions entered into by the debtor on the ground
that these transactions give some creditors a preference. In this article,
Mr. Seligson examines section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act to determine
when this can be done. He discusses the elements of preferential trans-
fers, the problems of proof, the relationship between state and federal
law, and the manner in which the statutory provisions have been ap-
plied by the courts.
I. NATURE AND DEFINMON OF A PREFERENCE
Equity is equality. That maxim is a theme of bankruptcy administration1
-one of the cornerstones of the bankruptcy structure. All persons similarly
situated are entitled to equality in treatment in the distribution of the
assets of the bankrupt estate. It would be inequitable to disregard what
has transpired prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. As has been
aptly said, "if the creditors and debtor could deal with impunity with the
debtor's assets up to the date of bankruptcy, only tag ends and remnants
of unencumbered assets would too often remain."2 Thus the Bankruptcy
Act provides the trustee with an arsenal of weapons to enable him to
bring into the estate for distribution property which in equity and good
conscience should be available to all. The power to avoid preferential
transfers is one of these weapons.
1. Preferences at Common Law
At common law a preferential transfer was not considered immoral or
improper.3 Courts of equity, as well as courts of law, allowed a debtor to
prefer one creditor over another if the transfer was designed to pay or
secure an honest debt.4 The debtor had the unquestioned right "to confess
a judgment in favor of a particular creditor, for an honest debt then due,"5
and the right of such judgment to hold its priority could not be challenged.
It is true that this attitude of the courts encouraged a race among credi-
tors, engendered favoritism by the debtor and resulted in inequality of
*Member, Seligson, Morris & Neuburger, New York City; Professor of Law, New
York University School of Law; co-author, Collier on Bankruptcy (14th ed. 1941);
member, United States Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules.
1. Canright v. General Fin. Corp., 35 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Ill. 1940).
2. 3 COLLIER, BANxRUpTcY 11 60.01, at 742 (14th ed. 1956).
3. 3 CoLLER, BANKRupTcY I 60.02, .03 (14th ed. 1956).
4. 3 CoLIER, BANKuP'Tcy 60.02 (14th ed. 1956).
5. Williams v. Brown, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 682, 685 (N.Y. Ch. 1820).
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distribution. Nonetheless, as noted with regret by Chancellor Kent in
regard to preferences, "in cases not provided for by statute, the proceed-
ing cannot ordinarily be controlled."6
2. State Statutes Outlawing Preferential Transfers
Many of the states have attempted to meet the problem by statutory
action outlawing preferential transfers made by corporations.7 A few
have gone further and have extended the prohibition against preferential
transfers to individuals and partnerships as well as to corporations. 8 On
the whole, state efforts in this field of the law have not been entirely
successful in preventing favored creditors from absorbing all of the assets
of their insolvent debtor. As a result thereof, Congress has in the Bank-
ruptcy Act attempted to meet the problem on a national basis. This law
of preferences has been said to be "the main contribution of the Bank-
ruptcy Act to the law of creditors' rights."9
3. Relationship of Various Sections of Bankruptcy Act Dealing
With Preferences
Section 60a(1)10 defines a preference and sub-division b of section 6011
states the circumstances under and the extent to which preferential trans-
fers may be avoided. Section 3a,12 dealing with acts of bankruptcy, is
6. ibid.
7. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW § 15; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:14-2 (1939).
8. Omo Rev. CoDE ANN. § 1313.56 (Baldwin); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 3987 (1955).
9. McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 60 HArv. L. RV.. 233, 235
(1946).
10. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(1), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 96a(1) (1958), reads as follows: "A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title,
of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account
of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four
months before the filing by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under
this title, the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a
greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class."
11. Bankruptcy Act § 60b, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §
96b (1958), reads as follows: "Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee
if the creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby or his agent acting with
reference thereto has, at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to
believe that the debtor is insolvent. Where the preference is voidable, the trustee may
recover the property or, if it has been converted, its value from any person who has
received or converted such property, except a bona-fide purchaser from or lienor of
the debtor's transferee for a present fair equivalent value: Provided, however, That
where such purchaser or lienor has given less than such value, he shall nevertheless
have a lien upon such property, but only to the extent of the consideration actually
given by him. Where a preference by way of lien or security title is voidable, the
court may on due notice order such lien or title to be preserved for the benefit of
the estate, in which event such lien or title shall pass to the trustee. For the purpose
of any recovery or avoidance under this section, where plenary proceedings are
necessary, any State court which would have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not
intervened and any court of bankruptcy shall have concurrent jurisdiction."
12. Bankruptcy Act § 3a, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 546 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 21a
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correlated with section 60 by the provision therein that a preferential trans-
fer as defined in section 60a made or suffered by a person shall be an act
of bankruptcy. It should be noted here, however, that there may be a
transfer which is a preference under section 60a and therefore an act of
bankruptcy but which could not be avoided under section 60b.
4. Preferential Transfer Distinguished From Fraudulent Conveyance
The preferential transfer must be distinguished from the fraudulent
transfer. Under the Statute of Elizabeth 13 as well as under the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyances Act14 a transfer made with intent to hinder, delay
or defraud creditors is null and void. Every preferential transfer necessarily
hinders and delays other creditors in the collection of their claims. Un-
deniably, "whenever an insolvent debtor pays one of his creditors in full,
he thereby puts the cash or property so used beyond the reach of execution
by the others."' 5 In such a transfer, however, the hindering and delaying
is incidental and, so it has been held, 16 is not proscribed by the law applica-
ble to fraudulent conveyances.
5. Elements of a Preference Under the Bankruptcy Act
What are the elements of a preference under section 60a? There are
said to be six. These are (1) a transfer of the debtor's property, (2) to or
for the benefit of a creditor, (3) for or on account of an antecedent debt,
(4) made or suffered by the debtor while insolvent, (5) within four months
before the filing of the petition initiating the proceeding, and (6) the
effect of which transfer enables the creditor to obtain a greater percentage
of his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
II. TEcmICAL AsFxcrs OF A PREFERENCE
1. Transfer of Property of Debtor
The term "transfer" is defined in most comprehensive terms by section
1(30) of the act.17 It includes every mode, direct or indirect, of parting
(1958), so far as relevant, reads as follows: "Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall
consist of his having . . . (2) made or suffered a preferential transfer, as defined in
subdivision (a) of section 96 of this title.
13. Fraudulent Conveyances, 1571, 13 Eliz c. 5 (repealed).
14. UNirotm FRuDnuLrr CovEYAN C s ACT.
15. Irving Trust Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 65 F.2d 409, 410 (2d Cir. 1933).
16. Irving Trust Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 65 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1933).
17. Bankruptcy Act § 1(30), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1(30) (1958), defines transfer as follows: "'Transfer' shall include the sale and every
other and different mode, direct or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property
or with an interest therein or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon
property or upon an interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involun-
tarily, by or without judicial proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, assignment, payment,
pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbrance, gift, security, or otherwise; the retention of a
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with property or with an interest therein or with the possession thereof.
It covers the fixing of a lien upon property or upon any interest therein.
The transfer may be voluntary or involuntary, by or without judicial pro-
ceedings, and a retention of a security title to property delivered to a
debtor is deemed a transfer suffered by the debtor. Thus a transfer "may
be effected irrespective of any voluntary action on the part of the debtor
with reference to the transfer of his property."'18 And, as pointed out by one
authority, "any judicial proceeding which fixes a lien upon the property of
the debtor and which comes within the other requisites of § 60 will consti-
tute a voidable preference, irrespective of the lack of consent, acquiescence
or activity of the debtor."19
2. Transfer Must Be to or for Benefit of Creditor
Of course property of a third party, such as a surety, which is trans-
ferred to the creditor in payment of the debtor's obligation is not property
of the debtor 20 unless the surety is in some fashion reimbursed or secured
by the debtor.2 ' If payment is made by the surety out of funds supplied
to him directly or indirectly by the debtor then payment to the creditor will
be regarded as a transfer of the debtor's property.22
The term "property" does not include exempt property of the bankrupt.2 3
Thus in a case arising in the Tenth Circuit24 it was held that a transfer
of exempt property before bankruptcy and within four months thereof
could not be challenged if preferential even though made for an antecedent
debt and while the debtor was insolvent. A majority of the court saw no
reason why the bankrupt could not make a valid transfer of exempt prop-
erty25 prior to bankruptcy if he could do so after bankruptcy and after the
exempt property had been set apart from the bankrupt estate.25
security title to property delivered to a debtor shall be deemed a transfer suffered by
such debtor .. "
18. 3 COLLIm, BANKRUPTCY ir 60.09, at 787 (14th ed. 1956).
19. 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 60.11, at 792 (14th ed. 1956). See Adler v. Green-
field, 83 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1936).
20. Mason v. National Herkimer County Bank, 172 Fed. 529 (2d Cir. 1909), aff'd
sub nom. National Bank v. National Herkimer County Bank, 225 U.S. 178 (1912).
21. Cf. Stone v. Allied Clothing Corp., 140 N.J. Eq. 224, 54 A.2d 625 (Ch. 1947).
22. In the Matter of Solenberger, 190 F. Supp. 512 (W.D. Va. 1960).
23. 3 COLIER, BA RPTCY ff 60.25 (14th ed. 1956).
24. Rutledge v. Johanson, 270 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1959).
25. Exemptions allowed under federal and state laws in force in domicile of the
bankrupt are allowed. Bankruptcy Act § 6, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 548 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1958). The trustee is not vested with the title of the
bankrupt "to property which is held to be exempt ....... Bankruptcy Act § 70a,
ch. 541, 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110a (1958).
26. The bankrupt must claim his exemptions in his schedules, Bankruptcy Act §
7a(8), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 548 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 25a(8) (1958);
trustee shall "set apart the bankrupts' exemptions allowed by law, if claimed, and
report the items and estimated value thereof to the courts as soon as practicable after
their appointment," Bankruptcy Act § 47a(6), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 557 (1898), as
[ VoL. 15
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It should be noted that the return by the debtor of property acquired by
him through fraud, theft or misappropriation and to which the debtor has
no title does not qualify as a transfer of property of the debtor.27 The
owner is simply reclaiming his own property. But it is important in these
cases to make certain that the person reclaiming the property and assert-
ing title thereto has not waived the tort or fraud and elected to be treated
as a creditor.28
A transfer cannot be preferential if it is not made to or for the benefit
of a creditor. A transfer to one to whom the debtor owes no money can-
not be a preferential transfer although it may be a fraudulent one. The
term "creditor" is defined in section 1(11) of the act.29 It includes only
one owning a claim provable in bankruptcy and provability of claims is
determined by section 63 of the act.30 Thus a preferential transfer can be
made only where it is to or for the benefit of a person holding a provable
claim. A guarantor, surety or endorser for the bankrupt is a creditor since
he is the holder of a provable claim.31 Payment of an endorsed note or
guaranteed claim inures to the benefit of the endorser or guarantor32 and
it is immaterial that the endorser or guarantor procures the payment.33
Cases frequently arise in which a corporation borrows money from a
bank and the bank's note is endorsed or guaranteed by the principal stock-
holder and officer of the corporation or his wife or relative. The corpora-
tion becomes insolvent, the bank is paid and the trustee sues both the
bank and the endorser or guarantor to recover the amount of the payment.
In these situations the payment to the bank is for the benefit of the endorser
or guarantor; therefore, if the other elements of a voidable preference can
be established the trustee may recover from both the bank and the en-
dorser34 or guarantor or from one35 or the other. 36 It may not be possible
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 75a(6) (1958); the trustee shall make his report of the articles
set off to the bankrupt within five days after receiving the notice of his appointment,
and any creditor or the bankrupt may object within ten days after the filing of the
report, GENERAL OmER No. 17; the bankruptcy court is vested with jurisdiction to
"determine all claims of bankrupts to their exemptions," Bankruptcy Act § 2a(11-),
ch. 575,52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11a(11) (1958).
27. Keystone Warehouse Co. v. Bissell, 203 Fed. 652 (2d Cir. 1913).
28. Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924); 3 COLLIER, BANmKuPTCY f[ 60.18
(14th ed. 1956).
29. Bankruptcy Act § 1(11), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1(11) (1958), defines creditor as follows: "'Creditor' shall include anyone who owns
a debt, demand, or claims provable in bankruptcy, and may include his duly authorized
agent, attorney, or proxy ... "
30. Bankruptcy Act § 63, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1958).
31. Stem v. Paper, 183 Fed. 228 (D.N.D. 1910), afd, 198 Fed. 642 (8th Cir.
1912); 3 Couznm, BANimuprcy 60.17 (14th ed. 1956).
32. Irving Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 6 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
33. 3 CoLER, BAmmRuprTcy , 60.17 (14th ed. 1956).




for the trustee to prove all of the elements of a voidable preference as
against the bank but he may be able to do so against the endorser or
guarantor. In one case arising in the southern district of New York,3 7 the
trustee succeeded in recovering a judgment against both and the court then
entered a judgment over in favor of the bank against the endorsers.
3. Transfer Must Be for or on Account of Antecedent Debt
A transfer for a present consideration cannot be preferential because the
transferee is not being preferred over other creditors. In that situation
there is no depletion or diminution of the estate.3 It follows that a substi-
tution of property by property of equal value cannot be preferential be-
cause there is no diminution or depletion of the estate.3 9 A transfer made
in satisfaction of an unassailable mortgage, pledge, trust receipt, mechanic's
lien or other valid lien is supported by a present consideration where the
property subject to lien is at least equal to the amount of the payment.40
Hence such a transfer cannot be preferential. Both the Second 41 and
Ninth -42 circuits have held that payments made to a subcontractor do not
diminish or deplete the estate otherwise available for the general creditors
of the bankrupt where the subcontractor could have filed a lien or a stop-
notice under applicable local law (New York and California) or state law
imposed a mandatory obligation upon the prime contractor to pay the
subcontractor. This conclusion is in accord with the recent decision of the
New York Court of Appeals in Aquilino v. United States43 that a contractor
has no interest in any moneys due from the owner of improved property
except to the extent that the amount due exceeds the unpaid claims of
subcontractors.
There may be a transfer supported by both a present and a past con-
sideration. 44 The fact that there is a partial present consideration will not
be sufficient to save the transfer from being preferential in regard to that
part of the consideration which is past.45 Problems frequently arise in
connection with cash sales and the courts are not in agreement as to when
a cash sale ceases to be such and a creditor-debtor relationship arises.
In a case involving the preference statutes of the State of Washington,46
35. 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 60.58 (14th ed. 1956).
36. See note 32 supra.
37. See note 34 supra.
38. In re Perpall, 271 Fed. 466 (2d Cir. 1921).
39. 3 CoLumn, BANKRUPTCY 11 60.21 (14th ed. 1956).
40. Dinkelspiel v. Weaver, 116 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Ark. 1953); 3 COLLIER,
BANKRUPTrcY ff 60.22 (14th ed. 1956).
41. Ricotta v. Burns Coal & Bldg. Supply Co., 264 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1959).
42. Keenan Pipe & Supply Co. v. Shields, 241 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1956).
43. 10 N.Y.2d 271, 219 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1961).
44. In the Matter of Cable Link Corp., 135 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Mich. 1955).
45. Ibid.
46. Engstrom v. Wiley, 191 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1951). Wash. Laws 1941, ch. 103,
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the defendant sold and delivered wheat to the bankrupt and in exchange
therefor received a check drawn upon a bank located in the city in which
the bankrupt carried on business. Ten days later and within four months of
bankruptcy the check was deposited by the defendant in his bank account
in another city and was paid by the drawee bank the next day out of the
bankrupts funds then on deposit. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the trial court in its conclusion that these facts gave rise to a
cash transaction and that there was no diminution of the estate of the bank-
rupt. It recognized that if it was intended "to extend credit even for a day
or to sell the property on credit, there would be no question."47 However,
the parties intended a completed transaction, they did not create a debt,
the defendant was not a creditor and "the wheat and the money were
equivalents and were exchanged."48 As the appellate court pointed out,
although "the conditions of delivery and payment are concurrent "49 in a
cash sale, if that is what the parties intend, "the delivery and payment
need not be exactly simultaneous."50 The acceptance of the check by de-
fendant instead of cash did not change the character of the transaction.
According to the appellate court "the seller who took the check had a
reasonable time to deposit it and receive the cash."51
In another case involving the Washington preference statutes the same
result was reached by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.52 There the
defendant sold a negotiable warehouse receipt to the bankrupt "intending
to make a cash sale ... of the actual wheat at an agreed net price. . .. 53
The bankrupt, without fault of the defendant, failed to issue its check for
the wheat until ten days later. This check was payable to the defendant
and was received by him the next day. The deposit was made in a bank in
a city distant from that in which the drawee bank was located. The check
was returned because of insufficient funds and was redeposited and pre-
sented to the drawee bank two weeks from the delivery of the warehouse
receipt. It was not then paid because the bankrupts account was over-
drawn but was honored seven days later.
On the foregoing facts, the trial court decided that payment of the check
did not constitute an unlawful preference under the Washington statutes
§ 1(c), entitled "Insolvent Corporation," reads as follows: "'Preference' means a
judgment procured or suffered against itself by an insolvent corporation or a transfer
of any of the property of such corporation, the effect of the enforcement of which
judgment or transfer at the time it was procured, suffered, or made, would be to
enable any one of the creditors of such corporation to obtain a greater percentage of
his debt than any other creditor of the same class."
47. 191 F.2d at 687.
48. Id. at 686.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. 1d. at 687.
52. Engstrom v. Benzel, 191 F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1951).
53. Id. at 690.
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"as the transaction was in substance and effect a cash transaction . . .
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. That court declared that
the intention of the parties was "immaterial in determining whether there
was a preference."55 In its view, the important questions were whether
there was an antecedent debt and whether the assets had been diminished.
Both questions were answered in the negative. No creditor-debtor rela-
tionship had been intended or had arisen. The property in the warehouse
receipt did not pass to the bankrupt until the defendant-seller was paid in
cash. When that occurred there was no depletion of the bankrupt's estate.
Until actual payment the defendant "still had a right to recover the nego-
tiable instrument showing the delivery of the wheat to the warehouse."56
In a recent case,57 however, arising in Iowa, where the trustee sought to
recover under section 60a and b, a different view seems to have been taken
by the court as to when a cash transaction ceases to be such. In that case
the debtor's check was given to the defendant in payment of corn pur-
chased and hauled away from the defendant's place of business. The check
was returned for insufficient funds twice and was paid about one month
from the date it was delivered to the defendant. The court pointed out
that to effect a preference a transfer must diminish the fund to which
other creditors of the same class may resort for payment. Thus, when a
debtor engages in a straight cash transaction, wherein something of value
is purchased for a reasonable price, a diminution of the debtor's estate
does not occur. However, as the court noted, any extension of credit, no
matter how brief, establishes an antecedent debt under section 60 of the
act.
The court conceded that under ordinary circumstances "the holder of a
check given as payment in a cash sale does not become a creditor on an
antecedent debt by waiting a reasonable time to cash the check. . . . If
the check is honored in due course, there has been a substantially simulta-
neous exchange of cash for goods."5 8 Thus the issue before the court in
the transaction which began as a cash one with no extension of credit was
whether "the delay in the ultimate payment transformed that transaction
into one involving an extension of credit."5 9 Relying upon the rationale of
a Ninth Circuit case,60 which had been approved by the Eighth Circuit,61
the court concluded "that the circumstances in the present case were such
that the defendant did become a creditor of the bankrupt after the check
54. Id. at 691.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Engelkes v. Farmers Co-op. Co., 194 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Iowa 1961).
58. Id. at 324.
59. Ibid.
60. Security Trust & Say. Bank v. William R. Staats Co., 233 Fed. 514 (9th Cir.
1916), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 639 (1916).
61. Bostian v. Levich, 134 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1943).
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was initially returned because of insufficient funds .... "62 Accordingly,
the payment ultimately made by the bankrupt was made upon this ante-
cedent obligation.
Money which is not part of the general assets of the bankrupt cannot be
the subject of a preferential transfer.63 Hence if a loan is made to the
debtor for the express purpose of paying or securing another creditor there
is no diminution or depletion of the estate.64 There is simply a substitution
of creditors with no resulting preference in the bankruptcy sense.
Bank deposits occupy a special status. Ordinarily a deposit in a bank
creates a debtor-creditor relationship.65 If the bank is a creditor it has the
right of set-off under section 68a 66 provided that the deposit is made in the
regular course of business to the checking account of the depositor.6 7 There
is no diminution of the estate of the depositor-debtor when the deposit is
made because he receives a credit which in the same amount becomes
available to him at once.6 The indebtedness from the bank to the de-
positor is an asset of the debtor's estate. The law is otherwise where the
deposit or deposits to the account of the debtor are made pursuant to a
scheme or device to enable the bank to exercise its right of set-off.
69
Finally, in regard to consideration, it is well to remember that a transfer
which is supported by a present consideration may, by reason of a post-
ponement of recordation and thus effectiveness as against creditors, become
a transfer supported by an antecedent indebtedness. Thus where condi-
tional sales contracts were not timely filed as required by applicable New
York law, the transfer was not deemed perfected until the date of actual
filing, and what was originally a present consideration became an anteced-
ent one.70
4. Transfer Must Be Made While Debtor Insolvent
The debtor must be insolvent at the time the transfer is made or is
deemed to have been made. This insolvency must be in the bankruptcy
sense; as defined by section 1(19), 71 this is an insufficiency of assets at fair
62. Engelkes v. Farmers Co-op. Co., supra note 57, at 325.
63. Grubb v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 94 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1938).
64. Saper v. Wood, 249 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1957); Chiarovano v. Buttnick, 358 P.2d
305 (Wash. 1961).
65. See 27 TEXAs L. REv. 252 (1948).
66. Section 68a states that "in all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between
the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt
shall be set off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid."
Bankruptcy Act § 68a, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 878 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 108a (1958).
67. New York County Nat'l Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138 (1904); Citizens Nat'l
Bank v. Lineberger, 45 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1930).
68. Ibid.
69. See note 65 supra.
70. In re Morasco, 233 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1956).
71. This section reads as follows: "A person shall be deemed insolvent within the
provisions of this title whenever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any
1961]
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valuation to pay the aggregate of debts. This has been called "'a balance
sheet' definition and requires the weighing of assets against liabilities."
72
In this respect "it differs ... from the conventional definition of insolvency
(in the equity sense) which is 'a general inability to meet pecuniary
liabilities as they mature, by means of either available assets or an honest
use of credit."'73
The term "fair valuation" has been defined as "the fair cash value or the
fair market value of the property (of the debtor) as between one who
wants to purchase and one who wants to sell the property."74 In other
words, fair valuation is what a willing purchaser would pay to a willing
seller. As applied to accounts receivable, fair valuation has been construed
to mean "such as would be available to the bankrupt himself with which
to meet his liabilities within a reasonable time."7 5 It is not what could be
realized on these receivables in time by patient and persistent effort, but
rather their value now.7 6 Of course property fraudulently transferred or
concealed is by definition excluded from determination of insolvency.77 As
a result of the application of these principles of "fair valuation" the courts
have determined the debtor to be insolvent in many cases where the book
value of the assets was considerably in excess of the aggregate of the
liabilities. 8
Where insolvency is shown to exist at a given date it may be inferred
that the debtor was insolvent at a prior or subsequent date where there is
no showing of any substantial change in the intervening period.79 There
is a difference of opinion among the courts as to whether the amount
actually realized for the assets in the bankruptcy liquidation may be
considered as evidence bearing upon insolvency at the date of bankruptcy. 80
The courts also do not agree on the admissibility of the bankrupt's sched-
ules as evidence of insolvency.
81
The transfer may be voluntary of involuntary. The definition of transfer
makes that clear. Moreover, the term "suffered" as used in the statute does
property which he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, removed, or permitted
to be concealed or removed, with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors,
shall not at a fair valuation be sufficient in amount to pay his debts . " Bankruptcy
Act § 1(19), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1958).
72. Engelkes v. Farmers Co-op. Co., supra note 57, at 327.
73. Ibid.
74. Grandison v. National Bank of Commerce, 231 Fed. 800, 804 (2d Cir. 1916).
75. Louisiana Natl Life Assur. Soc'y v. Segen, 196 Fed. 903, 905 (E.D. La. 1912).
76. In re Coddington, 118 Fed. 281, 282 (M.D. Pa. 1902).
77. See note 71 supra.
78. See, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 6 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y.
1934).
79. Engelkes v. Farmers Co-op. Co., supra note 57; New York Credit Men's Ass'n
v. Chaityn, 29 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).




not require any conscious participation by the debtor.82 It is the result
and not the knowledge or intent of the debtor which controls in determin-
ing whether a preference has been suffered.P Therefore a debtor may
unintentionally and unwillingly suffer a preferential transfer. A good
example of a transfer suffered is a sale of assets under an execution."4
Certainly this sale cannot be held to be a voluntary or conscious act on the
part of the debtor, assuming no fraud in the procurement of the judgment.
Indeed in one case85 it was held that a transfer had been suffered where
trustees under a deed of trust executed by the debtor and covering his
property had preferentially transferred portions of that property to other
creditors.
5. Transfer Must Be Within Four Months of Petition
The trustee must establish that the transfer was made within four months
prior to the date of the filing of the petition. Here the trustee is aided by
section 60a which provides that a transfer is deemed to have been made
when it is perfected. As to personal property a judicial lien-creditor test 6
is applied to determine perfection of transfer and as to real property a bona
fide purchase test is used.87 If a transfer is not so perfected before the
petition is fied then it is deemed to have been made immediately before
the filing of the petition.88 The judicial lien-creditor and bona fide purchase
tests are applied without regard to whether there are such creditors or
bona fide purchasers.89 It must be emphasized that this section does not
82. Warner v. Dworsky, 194 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1952).
83. Ibid.
84. Bronner v. Safinna, 25 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
85. Warner v. Dworsky, supra note 82.
86. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 96a(2) (1958), so far as relevant, reads as follows: "For the purposes of subdivisions
(a) and (b) of this section, a transfer of property other than real property shall be
deemed to have been made or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected
that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceed-
ings on a simple contract could become superior to the rights of the transferee."
87. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 96a(2) (1958), so far as relevant, reads as follows: "A transfer of real property
shall be deemed to have been made or suffered when it became so far perfected that
no subsequent bona fide purchase from the debtor could create rights in such property
superior to the rights of the transferee."
88. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 96a(2) (1958), so far as relevant, reads as follows: "If any transfer of real property
is not so perfected against a bona fide purchase, or if any transfer of other property is
not so perfected against such liens by legal or equitable proceedings prior to the filing
of a petition initiating a proceeding under this title, it shall be deemed to have been
made immediately before the filing of the petition."
89. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(3), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 96a(2) (1958), so far as relevant, reads as follows: "If any transfer of real property
subdivision shall apply whether or not there are or were creditors who might have
obtained such liens upon the property other than real property transferred and whether
or not there are or were persons who might have become bona fide purchasers of such
real property."
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make the trustee a bona fide purchaser.
Paragraphs (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) of section 60a contain elaborate
provisions devoted to the treatment of equitable liens and the judicial lien
status of the trustee. The judicial lien test of perfection excludes liens given
special priority over prior liens under applicable law.90 This judicial lien
which is the criterion as to when a transfer of personal property is
perfected "is the one which a party to a simple contract might secure by
a judicial proceeding, either by virtue of a pre-judgment attachment or
garnishment, or by virtue of the decree or judgment itself (where state
law gives rise to a lien upon the entry of such judgment or decree) or by
further process to give effect thereto (as where the lien does not arise
until levy of an execution) .... "'9
The judicial lien which becomes superior to the rights of a transferee
must arise from the lien itself or from the lien plus action solely within
the control of the lienholder, aided only by ministerial acts of public
officials.9 2 Thus the lien used as the criterion for perfection of the transfer
"must be one.., which also can be obtained by steps within the control
of the one securing the lien-such as registering or docketing a judgment,
or the like even though that activity requires the cooperation of a minis-
terial official such as a clerk."93 If the challenged transfer involves real
estate "the trustee tests the transfer by the rights of a hypothetical pur-
chaser who has taken the requisite steps"9 4 to give him a prevailing status,
such as recordation. Where the agreement or concurrence of any third
party or further judicial action is required to make liens or purchases
effective then such liens or purchases are excluded.
90. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(4), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 96a(4) (1958). This section provides: "A lien obtainable by legal or equitable
proceedings upon a simple contract within the meaning of paragraph (2) of this
subdivision is a lien arising in ordinary course of such proceedings upon the entry or
docketing of a judgment or decree, or upon attachment, garnishment, execution, or like
process, whether before, upon, or after judgment or decree and whether before or upon
levy. It does not include liens which under applicable law are given a special priority
over other liens which are prior in time."
91. See comment on § 60a, 1960 COLLmR PAMPHLETr EDrmoN A 93.
92. See Bankruptcy Act § 60a(5), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 96a(5) (1958). This section provides: "A lien obtainable by legal or
equitable proceedings could become superior to the rights of a transferee or a
purchase could create rights superior to the rights of a transferee within the meaning
of paragraph (2) of this subdivision, if such consequences would follow only from
the lien or purchase itself, or from such lien or purchase followed by any step wholly
within the control of the respective lien holder or purchaser, with or without the aid
of ministerial action by public officials. Such a lien could not, however, become so
superior and such a purchase could not create such superior rights for the purposes
of paragraph (2) of this subdivision through any acts subsequent to the obtaining of
such a lien or subsequent to such a purchase which require the agreement or
concurrence of any third party or which require any further judicial action, or
ruling"
93. Note 91 supra.
94. Id. at A 94.
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Equitable liens which arise under state law where available means of per-
fecting legal liens have not been employed are denied recognition.9 Since in
most cases there will be means available for the perfection of legal liens, if
equitable liens result under local law, the liens will not be regarded as
perfected within the meaning of section 60a. As an illustration, in those
states where an equitable lien arises upon failure of a mortgagee to record
a chattel mortgage, the transfer will not be regarded as perfected despite
local law because the mortgagee could have obtained a valid legal lien by
recording the mortgage. Such an equitable lien created for a valuable
consideration will not be recognized even though "both parties intend to
perfect it and they take action sufficient to effect a transfer as against
[judicial] liens ... on a simple contract."- However, an equitable interest
may be transferred by the debtor "by any means appropriate to transfer
fully an interest of that character."
9 7
The purpose of the statute is to strike down secret liens and to eliminate
the doctrine of relation-back.9 Notwithstanding this objective, a limited
relation-back is permitted with respect to transfers of both real and per-
sonal property made for a new and contemporaneous consideration.
99 A
95. See Bankruptcy Act § 60a(6), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 96a(6) (1958). This section provides: "The recognition of equitable liens
where available means of perfecting legal liens have not been employed is hereby
declared to be contrary to the policy of this section. If a transfer is for security and if
(A) applicable law requires a signed and delivered writing, or a delivery of possession,
or a filing or recording, or other like overt action as a condition to its full validity
against third persons other than a buyer in the ordinary course of trade claiming
through or under the transferor and (B) such overt action has not been taken, and
(C) such transfer results in the acquisition of only an equitable lien, then such transfer
is not perfected within the meaning of paragraph (2) of this subdivision. Notwith-
standing the first sentence of paragraph (2) of this subdivision, it shall not suffice to
perfect a transfer which creates an equitable lien such as is described in the first
sentence of this paragraph, that it is made for a valuable consideration and that both
parties intend to perfect it and that they take action sufficient to effect a transfer as
against liens by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract: Provided, however,
That where the debtor's own interest is only equitable, he can perfect a transfer thereof
by any means appropriate fully to transfer an interest of that character: And provided
further, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to be contrary to the provi-
sions of paragraph (7) of this subdivision."
96. See comment on § 60a, 1960 CoLLrum PAmHLET EDrrioN A 94.
97. See note 95 supra.
98. 3 COLLI , BANmmurcy 9 60.38 (14th ed. 1956).
99. See Bankruptcy Act § 60a(7), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 96a(7) (1958). This section provides:
"Any provision in this subdivision to the contrary notwithstanding if the appli-
cable law requires a transfer of property other than real property for or on account
of a new and contemporaneous consideration to be perfected by recording, de-
livery, or otherwise, in order that no lien described in paragraph (2) of this
subdivision could become superior to the rights of the transferee therein, or if
the applicable law requires a transfer of real property for such a consideration to
be so perfected in order that no bona fide purchase from the debtor could create
rights in such property superior to the rights of the transferee, the time of
transfer shall be determined by the following rules:
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transfer may be perfected within twenty-one days or within a shorter period
if so fixed by state law and related back to the date of its actual execu-
tion. 00 Where there is delayed compliance (but prior to bankruptcy) with
the law applicable to the transfer (recording, delivery or otherwise) the
transfer is deemed made at the time of compliance. 101 If there is no
compliance before bankruptcy, the transfer is deemed to have been made
immediately before the filing of the petition.102 In case there are no
applicable local requirements regarding the transfer and it is wholly or in
part for a new and contemporaneous consideration, it is deemed made as
of the date of its execution to the extent of such consideration 03 Further-
more, if the transfer secures a future loan which is made, or the transfer
becomes security for a future loan, it has the same effect as a transfer for
a new and contemporaneous consideration.1 4 It has been suggested that
the first sentence of paragraph (8) of revised section 60a "was included
... so as to insure that assignments of accounts receivable will receive the
most favorable treatment possible where the state law requires nothing
more than the execution of the assignment itself for perfection."105 The
need for the second sentence of paragraph (8) is questionable since "it has
always been the rule that a transfer for a genuine future consideration is
not preferential."1 6
The significance of the perfection test is that by postponing the effective
date of a transfer it postpones consideration of the existence of the elements
"I. Where (A) the applicable law specifies a stated period of time of not
more than twenty-one days after the transfer within which recording, delivery, or
some other act is required, and compliance therewith is had within such stated
period of time; or where (B) the applicable law specifies no such stated period
of time or where such stated period of time is more than twenty-one days, and
compliance therewith is had within twenty-one days after the transfer, the
transfer shall be deemed to be made or suffered at the time of the transfer.
"El. Where compliance with the law applicable to the transfer is not had in
accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (1) of this paragraph, the transfer
shall be deemed to be made or suffered at the time of compliance therewith, and
if such compliance is not had prior to the filing of the petition initiating a pro-
ceeding under this title, such transfer shall be deemed to have been made or
suffered immediately before the filing of such petition."
100. See comment on § 60a, 1960 CoL=.xu PAWRrLE-r EDITON A 95.
101. See note 99 supra.
102. Ibid.
103. See Bankruptcy Act § 60a(8), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 96a(8) (1958). This section provides: "If no such requirement of appli-
cable law specified in paragraph (7) of this subdivision exists, a transfer wholly or in
part, for or on account of a new and contemporaneous consideration shall, to the
extent of such consideration and interest thereon and the other obligations of the
transferor connected therewith, be deemed to be made or suffered at the time of the
transfer. A transfer to secure a future loan, if such a loan is actually made, or a
transfer which becomes security for a future loan, shall have the same effect as a
transfer for or on account of a new and contemporaneous consideration."
104. Ibid.




of a preference 10 7 from the time the transfer is actually made to the time
the transfer is deemed to have been made. 08 Therefore a transfer sup-
ported by a present consideration at the time it is actually made will be
supported by an antecedent debt at the time the transfer is deemed to
have been made. 09 All the elements of a voidable preference, other than
the element of greater percentage, 110 will be determined as of the time of
perfection, if perfected before the petition is filed, and if not, as of the date
of the filing of the petition.
Of course state law determines when a transfer becomes perfected as
against a judicial lien creditor or a bona fide purchaser."' Consequently
state law determines the time of perfection of a transfer. State law, how-
ever, cannot validate a transfer which is a voidable preference under section
60a, b.
In a case arising in New York, 112 the debtor within four months prior to
bankruptcy had executed to its attorneys and accountants an assignment
of all its claims for refund of customs duties paid under protest to the
United States. When the assignment was made and at bankruptcy the
claims had not been allowed by the United States and were being prose-
cuted on behalf of the assignor. On these facts the district court decided
that under applicable New York law the assignment was not perfected at
the time of its making and therefore must be deemed to have been made
immediately before the filing of the petition. The court of appeals agreed
with the result but not with the reasoning of the district court. In its view
the purported assignment was unenforceable under the Assignment of
Claims Act because the customs refund claims had not been allowed.
Therefore the assignment was not perfected within the meaning of section
60a(2). The trustee had no difficulty in establishing all of the oilier
elements of voidable preference as of the date of bankruptcy.
In another case,113 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals construing appl-
cable Texas law ruled that the filing of notice of assignment protected only
accounts receivable which were in existence when the notice was executed.
The receivables in question were not in existence at the date of the filing of
the notice. The court decided that since there were available means of
perfecting legal liens with respect to the accounts which had not been
employed, the equitable liens arising from the assignment would be
denied recognition.
The four month period is of course an arbitrary one. Congress could
107. See note 10 supra.
108. Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
109. Ibid.
110. Palmer Clay Prods. Co. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227 (1936).
111. McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365 (1945).
112. Matter of Ideal Mercantile Corp., 244 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1957), affirming 143
F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
113. Republic Natl Bank v. Vial, 232 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1956).
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have lengthened this period to eight or twelve months or more or could
have shortened it to one or two months. The four month period has
acquired historical significance and it is correlated with the time period
for acts of bankruptcy1 4 and the time provisions of the act with respect
to the nullification of judicial liens.115 Section 60a, b penalizes the
vigilant creditor who by his diligence succeeds in collecting or securing
his just claim. At the same time, however, by confining avoidable prefer-
ential transfers to those made or deemed to have been made within the
four month period, Congress has not dealt too severely with preferential
transfers and has also given some stability to continued dealings with an
insolvent debtor. In addition, this time provision tends to avoid a race
among creditors to obtain payment before bankruptcy occurs. Hence it
implements the policy of the act to insure equality of treatment among
those similarly situated.
6. Creditor Must Receive Greater Percentage of Debt Than Other
Creditors of Same Class
The effect of the transfer must be to enable the creditor to obtain a
greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
The test of classification is the percentage paid upon the claims out of the
bankrupt estate.116 All creditors in the same class are entitled to receive
the same percentage. 7 It is not material that the owners of claims have
the right to collect from others than the bankrupt." 8 Finally, in this
regard, the determination is made when bankruptcy results and not at the
date of payment." 9 It would be extremely difficult for the court to
determine whether at the time of the transfer its effect would be to give
the transferee a preference over other creditors of the same class, so the
Supreme Court adopted the practical approach of determining the effect
of the transfer as of the date of bankruptcy.
III. AvoIANcE OF PREFERENTIAL TR NsFER By TRusTm IN BAxmnuprc
1. Trusteds Burden of Proof
A preferential transfer is established by proof of the existence of the
six elements which have been discussed. The trustee carries the burden
114. Bankruptcy Act § 3b, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 546 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 21b (1958).
115. Bankruptcy Act § 67a, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 107a (1958).
116. In re Silver, 109 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. IMi. 1953). See also In the Matter of
Driscoll, 142 F. Supp. 300 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
117. Swarts v. Fourth Natl Bank, 117 Fed. 1 (8th Cir. 1902).
118. Ibid.
119. Palmer Clay Prods. v. Brown, supra note 110.
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of proof'20 and he must establish a preferential transfer by a fair pre-
ponderance of the testimony.' 12 A preferential transfer under section 60a
is sufficient as an act of bankruptcy under section 3a.122 More, however, is
needed if the trustee seeks to set aside the transfer. In that case the burden
of proof rests upon the trustee to establish that at the time the transfer
was received the creditor or his agent acting with reference thereto had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.123
Reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent does not mean
that the trustee must show that the creditor had actual knowledge of
insolvency.124 On the other hand, a mere suspicion or apprehension of
insolvency is insufficient.25 It has been said that the creditor should have
a well grounded belief that the debtor is insolvent "based on some fact or
facts calculated to produce such a belief in the mind of an ordinarily
intelligent man."26 If the creditor has knowledge of facts sufficient to put
a prudent man upon inquiry, the creditor is charged with knowledge of
the facts such an inquiry would disclose.2 7 Thus, in the last analysis the
question of reasonable cause to believe must be resolved in the light of the
circumstances peculiar to the particular case, and whether the facts are
sufficient to compel the creditor to make an inquiry depends upon the
facts.=
Certainly less is required if the creditor is an insider-one actively
involved in the conduct of the business-than would be required in the
case of an outsider. 9 As was said in one case where the principal officer
was sued for the amount of a note paid to a bank which he had endorsed:
"He was in the active conduct of the business of the corporation. If the
corporation was insolvent, indisputably he knew it. He was not merely
put on inquiry. He knew it."130
The form of the transfer is an important factor in determining reasonable
cause to believe.131 Was the payment made in the regular course of busi-
ness? Did the debtor anticipate payment of the indebtedness or was the
120. 3 CoLusm, BANKRupTcY 60.62 (14th ed. 1956); Allender v. Southeast
Tractor & Equip. Co., 178 F. Supp. 413 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
121. Ibid.
122. Bankruptcy Act § 3a, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 546 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 21a (1958).
123. 3 COLLIER, B ' u'puurcy 1 60.62 (14th ed. 1956).
124. 3 Cowman, BANtmp'rcy 60.63 (14th ed. 1956).
125. Grant v. National Bank, 97 U.S. 80 (1877).
126. Mayo v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 190 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. La. 1960).
127. Pender v. Chatham Phenix Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 58 F.2d 968 (2d Cir.
1932).
128. In re Shelley Furniture, Inc., 283 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1960); Boston Nat'1
Bank v. Early, 17 F.2d 691 (1st Cir. 1927).
129. Irving Trust Co. v. Roth, 48 F.2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
130. Irving Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 6 F. Supp. 185, 190 (S.D.N.Y.
1934).
131. 3 CoLmun, BANMRUPTCY 1 60.54 (14th ed. 1956).
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debt long past due when paid? Did the creditor have or did he know of the
existence of dishonored checks or dishonored notes of the debtor?' 12 Had
the debtor failed to remit on assigned receivables? Did the creditor have
knowledge that the debtor was engaged in double financing? Had the
debtor ignored repeated demands for payment? Did the creditor institute
or threaten to institute suits or did he know of the pendency of suits to
collect past due indebtedness?
Was the transfer made in the form of cash distinguished from check?
Did the transfer take the form of a transfer of merchandise or other
property in satisfaction of the indebtedness and if so, had the property
been acquired in the first instance from the creditor?133 Was it customary
for the debtor to pay in cash or in kind? Was the source of funds for the
payment unusual or out of the regular course of business? Had the debtor
changed its bank or ceased to do business with his bank? Did the transfer
in and of itself disable the debtor from continuing the operation of
business?134
Insolvency is not based upon an inability to meet debts as they become
due, so it is urged that a shortage of ready money does not in and of itself
evidence insolvency. 135 It has also been found that the dishonoring of some
of the debtor's checks is not conclusive on whether the creditor had reason-
able cause to believe the debtor to be insolvent.13 On the other hand, it
has been held that knowledge of dishonored checks is evidence which may
be considered in determining whether the creditor has had sufficient notice
to put him on inquiry. 3 7 A man who is pressed gives ground for inquiry but
it does not follow that he is insolvent because he is not quick to pay.138
In a New York case139 in which it was held that a sale on execution of
all of the debtor's assets was a transfer, the court said that the defendant
knew that the bankrupts' bank account had been closed and that the
bankrupts were not honoring their checks and concluded that dishonoring
of checks was a clear indication of financial trouble sufficient to put the
defendant on inquiry. Moreover, in the view of the court the sale of the
entire physical assets of the bankrupts for an amount insufficient to satisfy
132. Bronner v. Safinna, 25 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Irving Trust Co. v.
Textile Banking Co., 3 F. Supp. 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1932), aff'd, 65 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir.
1933); Sams v. First Nat'l Bank, 182 Miss. 777, 181 So. 320 (1938).
133. Abdo v. Townshend, 282 Fed. 476 (4th Cir. 1922); McLaughlin v. Fisk
Rubber Co., 288 Fed. 72 (D. Mass. 1923).
134. Bronner v. Safinna, 25 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Pierre Banking & Trust
Co. v. Winkler, 39 S.D. 454, 165 N.W. 2 (1917).
135. Salter v. Guaranty Trust Co., 140 F. Supp. 111 (D. Mass. 1956).
136. Bostian v. Levich, 134 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1943).
137. Brown Shoe Co. v. Cams, 65 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1933); Grandison v. National
Bank of Commerce, 231 Fed. 800 (2d Cir. 1916).
138. Engelkes v. Farmers Co-op. Co., 194 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Iowa 1961).
139. See note 84 supra.
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the judgment was in itself enough to give the defendant reasonable cause
to believe.
There is a presumption that payments made by the debtor to creditors
are valid. 140 Thus the trustee must overcome this presumption by adequate
proof. If the inferences to be drawn from the proved facts are as consistent
with lack of reasonable cause as they are with reasonable cause, then the
trustee has failed to discharge the burden of proving the affirmative. 141
It can be seen that the question of reasonable cause to believe is a
question of ultimate fact. What may be sufficient to satisfy one trier of fact
may be insufficient for another. Thus in one New York case,142 the bank-
rupt and an affiliate corporation had operated as one business. A store
belonging to the affiliate was destroyed by fire and the proceeds of a
fire insurance policy were deposited in the bankrupts bank account in a
bank which held notes for loans. The bank set-off the loans against the
bank balance. The court found that the transfer of funds was a preference.
In a Ninth Circuit case,143 however, the bankrupt's place of business was
closed down as the result of a fire. Two days later the defendant, president
and manager of the bankrupt corporation, paid himself from the corporate
account a substantial sum owing to him for unpaid salary. The district
court ruled that the defendant did not have knowledge or reasonable
cause to believe and the court of appeals affirmed. This case can be
reconciled with the New York case only upon the theory that here, as the
appeals court pointed out, the evidence bearing on knowledge available
to the defendant concerning the financial condition of the bankrupt was
slender and inconclusive. In a third case 44 arising recently in the New
York State Supreme Court, summary judgment was entered by Justice
Matthew Levy in favor of the trustee; the action was against an active
principal officer of the bankrupt corporation who had issued two corporate
checks to himself in payment of antecedent debts shortly prior to bank-
ruptcy. The court thought it plain that a plea by such an officer, "not
having extended or widespread business interests, of lack of knowledge of
its financial condition-at least in respect of the fact of solvency or
insolvency-ought not to be acceptable as a tangible basis for the creation
of a triable issue." 45
Of course if a creditor is put on inquiry he cannot be charged with
reasonable cause to believe if such an inquiry would have gained the
140. 3 CoLLum, BANxurpTcy II 60.62 (14th ed. 1956).
141. 3 CoLLI, BA ,mxuTcY ff 60.62 (14th ed. 1956); Engelkes v. Farmers Co-op.
Co., 194 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Iowa 1961).
142. Irving Trust Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 13 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N.Y.
1935).
143. Williams v. McDonald, 244 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1957).
144. Parker v. Unowitz, 204 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup.Ct. 1960).
145. Id. at 524.
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creditor nothing, at least so it has been held by the Ninth Circuit.14 But
the creditor ought not to be permitted to rest upon information furnished
by the debtor.147 Proof of reasonable cause to believe must be directed to
the time when the transfer is made or is deemed to have been made.
Where the effective date of the transfer is postponed because of non-
perfection until just before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, 1'8 the
trustee's burden to establish reasonable cause to believe will not ordinarily
be a heavy one.
The trustee cannot recover the value of the property transfererd unless
it has been converted. 149 If the property is in substantially its former
condition the property, whatever its value, is the extent of the trustee's
recovery. 1'9 It has been held that federal law rather than state law applies
in defining conversion under section 60b.151 Refusal to return the property
to the trustee upon demand does not constitute a conversion under the
statute. 152 Where the property has been converted the creditor is liable
for the amount recovered if sold by him provided that amount is equal to
the amount the trustee would have realized therefor.'53 If the property was
sold at a sacrifice without justification the creditor may be surcharged
therefor.154
2. Protection of Bona Fide Purchaser From Preferred Creditor
The right of recovery vests in the trustee and in the receiver when
authorized by the court to sue.1 The recovery can be had only from the
person benefiting from the preference.156 As stated previously, that person
may be the transferee or some third party such as an endorser or guaran-
tor.15 7 However, "a bona fide purchaser from or lienor of the debtor's
transferee for a present fair equivalent value" is completely protected.15 8
146. In re Solof, 2 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1924).
147. 3 CoLLIER, BANxaruprcY 60.53, at 997 n.5 (14th ed. 1956).
148. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 96a(2) (1958).
149. 3 COLLIER, BAN -uzrcY 60.59 (14th ed. 1956). See also American Exchange
Bank v. Goetz, 283 Fed. 900 (7th Cir. 1922).
150. 3 COLLIm, BaNxvurcY 11 60.59. (14th ed. 1956). See also Ernst v. Mechan-
ics' & Metals Nat'l Bank, 201 Fed. 664 (2d Cr. 1912), aff'd sub nom. National
City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50 (1913); Irving Trust Co. v. Conte, 22 F. Supp.
94 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
151. Perkins v. Remillard, 84 F. Supp. 224 (D. Mass. 1949).
152. Ibid.
153. Horowitz v. Huber, 34 F.2d 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). See also Walcott v. Com-
mercial Inv. Trust Co., 7 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
154. Jentzer v. Viscose Co., 82 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1936).
155. Bankruptcy Act § 2a(3), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 545 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ lla(3) (1958). See also 3 CoLT.ra, BAmxmurcy 60.57 (14th ed. 1956).
156. 3 Cour.m, BAmsmupTcy ff 60.58 (14th ed. 1956).
157. Irving Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 6 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1934);
Irving Trust Co. v. Bank of Manhattan Trust Co., 8 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
158. See note 11 supra.
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In that connection, it should be noted that bona fide purchaser is defined in
the Act to "include a bona fide encumbrancer or pledgee and the transferee,
immediate or mediate of any of them."5 9 The bona fide purchaser theory
is applied pro tanto where the purchaser or lienor gives less than "a present
fair equivalent value."'r
Section 60b contains a special provision which enables the trustee to
take advantage of the position of a lienor whose lien has been voided. 161
If the situation warrants, the court may on due notice order that the lien
or security title be preserved for the benefit of the estate, in which event
the lien or title passes to the trustee.
3. Proceedings for Recovery of Preference
Where plenary proceedings are necessary, any state court of competent
jurisdiction and any court of bankruptcy have concurrent jurisdiction for
the purpose of recovery or avoidance.162 Thus the trustee has a choice of
forums when he is compelled to take plenary action. Plenary proceedings
are unnecessary, however, when the property subject to the alleged void-
able lien or security title is in the possession of the bankrupt 63 or where
the creditor consents to the exercise of summary jurisdiction by the bank-
ruptcy court.164 It should be noted that section 57g specifically provides
that "the claims of creditors who have received or acquired preferences
...voidable under this Act, shall not be allowed unless such creditors
shall surrender such preferences .... 165 In most jurisdictions, the findings
of the bankruptcy court under section 57g as to the existence of a prefer-
ence will be res judicata against the creditor in a subsequent plenary
action.166 In a few jurisdictions an affirmative judgment may be entered
159. Bankruptcy Act § 1(5), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1(5) (1958).
160. See note 11 supra.
161. Bankruptcy Act § 60b, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 96b (1958), so far as relevant, provides: "Where a preference by way of lien or
security title is voidable, the court may on due notice order such lien or title to be
preserved for the benefit of the estate, in which event such lien or title shall pass to
the trustee."
162. Bankruptcy Act § 60b, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 96b (1958), so far as relevant, provides: "For the purpose of any recovery or
avoidance under this section, where plenary proceedings are necessary, any State
court which would have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened and any
court of bankruptcy shall have concurrent jurisdiction." See also Bankruptcy Act §
23b, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 552 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 46b (1958).
163. Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191 (1926).
164. MacDonald v. Plymouth County Trust Co., 286 U.S. 263 (1932).
165. Bankruptcy Act § 57g, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 560 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 93g (1958).
166. Giffin v. Vought, 175 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1949); Breit v. Moore, 220 Fed. 97
(9th Cir. 1915).
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in the bankruptcy court against the preferee in disposing of his claim. 16 7
A suit to recover for a transfer of money is an action at law with the
right to trial by jury, if plenary proceedings are required.168 But where
the relief sought is clearly equitable there is no right to jury trial since
the suit is one in equity.169 The trustee need not allege or prove a demand
and refusal to surrender the preference. 70 If a demand is made, however,
interest is generally allowed to the trustee from the time thereof'7 ' and if
not from the commencement of suit.172
Section lie 7 3 fixes a two year statute of limitations and the United
States Supreme Court has held'74 this section applicable to a suit to set
aside a preferential transfer. The trustee must therefore act promptly to
investigate whether a voidable preferential transfer has been made, for if
he does not, he will be foreclosed from action against the creditor. It has
also been held that the two year limitation applies in summary proceed-
ings. 75
Finally, it should be noted that section 60C76 under certain circumstances
permits new credit extended to the debtor to be set-off against the amount
which would otherwise be recoverable from the preferred creditor. This
provision should be distinguished from section 681 7 which allows a set-off
in cases of mutual debts and credits. It is important to remember that the
right to set-off under section 60c and the right of set-off under section 68
may be asserted in the same action.1
167. Continental Cas. Co. v. White, 269 F.2d 213 (4th Cir. 1959); Inter-state Nat'l
-Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955).
168. Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92 (1932).
169. Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., supra note 168; Walker v. Wilkinson, 3 F.2d
867 (5th Cir. 1925).
170. Stephens v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 36 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1930).
171. 3 CoTr.aT , BANKRUPTCY IT 60.63 (14th ed. 1956).
172. Ibid.
173. Bankruptcy Act § le, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 549 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 29e (1958).
174. Herget v. Central Nat'1 Bank, 324 U.S. 4 (1945).
175. 1 CoLraaE, BANKRupTCY f 11.13 (14th ed. 1956).
176. Bankruptcy Act § 60c, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 96c (1958).
177. Bankruptcy Act § 68, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §
108 (1958).
178. Wertz v. National City Bank, 115 F.2d 65 (7th Cir. 1940).
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